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Abstract
We propose and investigate a simple plausibility-based
extension semantics for abstract argumentation frame-
works based on generic instantiations by default knowl-
edge bases and the ranking construction paradigm for
default reasoning.1
1 Prologue
The past decade has seen a flourishing of abstract argumen-
tation theory, a coarse-grained high-level form of defeasible
reasoning introduced by Dung [Dung 95]. It is characterized
by a top-down perspective which ignores the logical fine
structure of arguments and focuses instead on logical (con-
flict, support, ...) or extra-logical (preferences, ...) relations
between given black box arguments so as to identify reason-
able argumentative positions. One way to address the com-
plexity of enriched argument structures carrying interacting
relations, and to identify the best approaches for evaluating
Dung’s basic attack frameworks as well as more sophisti-
cated argumentation systems, is to look for deeper unifying
semantic foundations allowing us to improve, compare, and
judge existing proposals, or to develop new ones.
A major issue is to what extent an abstract account can
adequately model concrete argumentative reasoning in the
context of a sufficiently expressive, preferably defeasible
logic. The instantiation of abstract frameworks by more fine-
grained logic-based argument constructions and configura-
tions is therefore an important tool for justifying or criti-
cising abstract argumentation theories. Most of this work is
however based on the first generation of nonmonotonic for-
malisms, like Reiter’s default logic or logic programming.
While these are closer to classical logic and the original
spirit of Dung’s approach, it is well known that they fail
to model plausible implication. In fact, they are haunted by
counterintuitive behaviour and violate major desiderata for
default reasoning encoded in benchmark examples and ra-
tionality postulates [Mak 94]. For instance, the only way to
deal even with simple instances of specificity reasoning are
opaque ad hoc prioritization mechanisms.
1This is an improved - polished and partly revised - version of
my ECSQARU 2013 paper. It adds a link to structured argumen-
tation, refines the semantic instantiation concept, and discusses at-
tacks between inference pairs.
The goal of the present work is therefore to supple-
ment existing instantiation efforts with a simple ranking-
based semantic model which interprets arguments and at-
tacks by conditional knowledge bases. The well-behaved
ranking construction semantics for default reasoning [Wey
96, 98, 03] can then be exploited to specify a new exten-
sion semantics for Dung frameworks which allows us to di-
rectly evaluate the plausibility of argument collections. Its
occasionally unorthodox behaviour may shed a new light on
basic argumentation-theoretic assumptions and concepts.
We start with an introduction to default reasoning based
on the ranking construction paradigm. After a short look
at abstract argumentation theory, we show how to interpret
abstract argumentation frameworks by instantiating the ar-
guments and characterizing the attacks with suitable sets
of conditionals describing constraints over ranking mod-
els. Based on the concept of generic instantiations, i.e. us-
ing minimal assumptions, and plausibility maximization, we
then specify a natural ranking-based extension semantics.
We conclude with a simple algorithm, some instructive ex-
amples, and the discussion of several important properties.
2 Ranking-based default reasoning
We assume a basic languageL closed under the usual propo-
sitional connectives, together with a classical satisfaction
relation |= inducing a monotonic entailment relation ⊢ ⊆
2L × L. The model sets of (L, |=) are denoted by [[ϕ]] =
{m | m |= ϕ}, resp. [[Σ]] = ∩ϕ∈Σ[[ϕ]] for Σ ⊆ L. BL is the
boolean proposition algebra over BL = {[[ϕ]] | ϕ ∈ L}. Let
Cn(Σ) = {ψ | Σ ⊢ ψ}.
Default inference is an important instance of nonmono-
tonic reasoning concerned with drawing reasonable but po-
tentially defeasible conclusions from knowledge bases of the
form Σ ∪∆, where Σ ⊆ L is a set of assumptions or facts,
e.g. encoding knowledge about a specific state of affairs in
the domain languageL, and∆ ⊆ L(։,❀) is a collection of
conditionals expressing strict or exception-tolerant implica-
tional information over L, which is used to guide defeasible
inference. L(։,❀) = {ϕ ։ ψ | ϕ, ψ ∈ L} ∪ {ϕ ❀ ψ |
ϕ, ψ ∈ L} is the corresponding flat conditional language on
top of L. In the following we will focus on finite Σ and ∆.
∆→ = {ϕ → ψ | ϕ ։ ψ, ϕ ❀ ψ} collects the material
implications corresponding to the conditionals in ∆.
The strict implication ϕ ։ ψ states that ϕ necessarily
implies ψ, forcing us to accept ψ given ϕ. The default im-
plication ϕ ❀ ψ tells us that ϕ plausibly/normally implies
ψ, and only recommends the acceptance of ψ given ϕ. The
actual impact of a default depends of course on the context
Σ ∪∆ and the chosen nonmonotonic inference concept |∼,
which will be discussed later.
We can distinguish two perspectives in default rea-
soning: the autoepistemic/context-based one, and the
plausibilistic/quasi-probabilistic one. The former is exem-
plified by Reiter’s default logic, where defaults are usually
modeled by normal default rules of the form ϕ : ψ/ψ (if ϕ,
and it is consistent that ψ, then ψ). A characteristic feature
is that the conclusions are obtained by intersecting suitable
equilibrium sets, known as extensions.
The alternative is to use default conditionals interpreted
by some preferential or valuational semantics, e.g. System Z
[Pea 90, Leh 92], or probabilistic ME-based accounts [GMP
93] (ME = maximum-entropy). For historical reasons and
technical convenience (closeness to classical logic), the first
approach has received most attention, especially in the con-
text of argumentation. However, this ignores the fact that
the conditional semantic paradigm has a much better record
when it comes to the natural handling of benchmark exam-
ples and the satisfaction of rationality postulates [Mak 94].
It therefore seems promising to investigate whether such
semantic-based accounts can also help to instantiate and
evaluate abstract argumentation frameworks.
Our default conditional semantics for interpreting argu-
mentation frameworks is based on the simplest plausibility
measure concept able to reasonably handle independence
and conditionalization, namely Spohn’s ranking functions
[Spo 88, 12], or more generally, ranking measures [Wey
94]. These are quasi-probabilistic belief valuations express-
ing the degree of surprise or implausibility of propositions.
Integer-valued ranking functions were originally introduced
by Spohn to model the iterated revision of graded plain be-
lief. We will consider [0,∞]real-valued ranking measures2,
where ∞ expresses doxastic impossibility.
Definition 2.1 (Real-valued ranking measures)
A map R : BL → ([0,∞], 0,∞,+,≤) is called a real-
valued ranking measure iff R([[T]]) = 0, R([[F]]) =
R(∅) = ∞, and for all A,B ∈ BL, R(A ∪ B) =
min≤{R(A), R(B)}. R(.|.) is the associated conditional
ranking measure defined byR(B|A) = R(A∩B)−R(A) if
R(A) 6= ∞, else R(B|A) = ∞. R0 is the uniform ranking
measure, i.e. R0(A) = 0 for A 6= ∅. If B = BL, we will use
the abbreviationR(ϕ) := R([[ϕ]]).
For instance, the order of magnitude reading interprets rank-
ing measure valuesR(A) as exponents of infinitesimal prob-
abilities P (A) = pAεR(A), which explains the parallels with
probability theory. The monotonic semantics of our condi-
tionals։,❀ is based on the satisfaction relation |=rk. The
corresponding truth conditions are
• R |=rk ϕ։ ψ iff R(ϕ ∧ ¬ψ) =∞.
• R |=rk ϕ❀ ψ iff R(ϕ ∧ ψ) + 1 ≤ R(ϕ ∧ ¬ψ).
2Although for us, rational values would actually be sufficient.
That is, we assume that a strict implication ϕ ։ ψ states
that ϕ ∧ ¬ψ is doxastically impossible.
Note that we may replace ϕ։ ψ by ϕ ∧ ¬ψ ❀ F, i.e. it
would be actually enough to consider L(❀). We use≤ with
a threshold because this provides more discriminatory power
and also guarantees the existence of minima for relevant
ranking construction procedures. The exchangeability of ar-
bitrary r, r′ 6= 0,∞ by automorphisms allows us to focus,
by convention, on the threshold 1. For ∆∪{δ} ⊆ L(։,❀),
we set
[[∆]]rk = {R | R |=rk ∆}, ∆ ⊢rk δ iff [[∆]]rk ⊆ [[δ]]rk.
⊢rk is monotonic and verifies the axioms and rules of prefer-
ential conditional logic and disjunctive rationality (threshold
semantics: no rational monotony) for❀ [KLM 90].
But it is important to understand that the central con-
cept in default reasoning is not some monotonic condi-
tional logic for L(։,❀), but a nonmonotonic meta-level
inference relation |∼ over L ∪ L(։,❀) specifying which
conclusions ψ ∈ L can be plausibly inferred from finite
Σ ∪ ∆ ⊆ L ∪ L(։,❀). We write Σ ∪ ∆ |∼ ψ, or alter-
natively Σ |∼∆ ψ, and set C|∼∆ (Σ) = {ψ | Σ |∼∆ ψ}.
The ranking semantics for plausibilistic default reasoning
is based on nonmonotonic ranking choice operators I which
map each finite ∆ ⊆ L(։,❀) to a collection I(∆) ⊆
[[∆]]rk of preferred ranking models of ∆. A corresponding
ranking-based default inference notion |∼I can then be spec-
ified by
Σ |∼I∆ ψ iff for all R ∈ I(∆), R |=rk ∧Σ❀ ψ.
Similarly, we can also define a monotonic inference concept
characterizing the strict consequences.
Σ ⊢I∆ ψ iff for all R ∈ I(∆), R |=rk ∧Σ։ ψ.
If I(∆) = [[∆]]rk, |∼I∆ is, modulo cosmetic details, equiv-
alent to preferential entailment (System P) [KLM 90]. If
≤pt describes the pointwise comparison of ranking mea-
sures, i.e. R ≤pt R′ iff for all A ∈ BL R(A) ≤ R′(A),
then I(∆) = {Min≤pt[[∆]]rk} essentially characterizes
System Z [Pea 90]. Because these approaches fail to ade-
quately deal with inheritance to exceptional subclasses, we
introduced and developed the construction paradigm for de-
fault reasoning [Wey 96, 98, 03], which is a powerful strat-
egy for specifying reasonable I based on Spohn’s Jeffrey-
conditionalization for ranking measures. The resulting de-
fault inference notions are well-behaved and show nice in-
heritance features. The essential idea is that defaults do not
only specify ranking constraints, but also admissible con-
struction steps to generate them. In particular, for each de-
fault ϕ ❀ ψ, we are allowed to uniformly shift upwards
(make less plausible/increase the ranks of) the ϕ ∧ ¬ψ-
worlds, which amounts to strengthen belief in the corre-
sponding material implication ϕ → ψ. If W is finite, this
is analogous to specifying the rank of a world by adding a
weight ≥ 0 for each default it violates. More formally, we
define a shifting transformationR→ R+ r[ρ] such that for
each ranking measure R, χ, ρ ∈ L, and r ∈ [0,∞], we set
(R+ r[ρ])(χ) = min{R(χ ∧ ρ) + r, R(χ ∧ ¬ρ)}.
This corresponds to uniformly shifting ρ by r.
Definition 2.2 (Constructibility)
Let ∆ = {ϕi ❀ / ։ ψi | i ≤ n} ⊆ L(։,❀). A
ranking measure R′ is said to be constructible from R over
∆, written R′ ∈ Constr(∆, R), iff there are ri ∈ [0,∞]
s.t. R′ = R+Σi≤nri[ϕi ∧ ¬ψi].3
For instance, we obtain a well-behaved robust default infer-
ence relation, System J [Wey 96], just by setting IJ(∆) =
Constr(∆, R0) ∩ [[∆]]rk. To implement shifting minimiza-
tion, we may strengthen System J by allowing proper shift-
ing (ri > 0) only if the targeted ranking constraint interpret-
ing a default ϕi ❀ ψi is realized as an equality constraint
R(ϕi ∧ ψi) + 1 = R(ϕi ∧ ¬ψi). Otherwise, the shifting
wouldn’t seem to be justified in the first place.
Definition 2.3 (Justifiable constructibility)
R is called a justifiably constructible model of ∆, written
R ∈ Ijj(∆) iff R |=rk ∆, R = R0 + Σi≤nri[ϕi ∧ ¬ψi],
and for each rj > 0, R(ϕj ∧ ψj) + 1 = R(ϕj ∧ ¬ψj).
It follows from a standard property of entropy maximiza-
tion (ME) that the order-of-magnitude translation of ME,
in the context of a nonstandard model of the reals with in-
finitesimals [GMP 93, Wey 95], to the ranking level always
produces a canonical justifiably constructible ranking model
Rme. We set Ime(∆) = {R∆me}. Hence, if ∆ 6 ⊢rk F,
R∆me ∈ Ijj(∆) 6= ∅. If Ijj(∆) is a singleton, we have
therefore |∼jj= |∼me. This holds for instance for minimal
core default sets ∆ [GMP 93], where no doxastically pos-
sible ϕi ∧ ¬ψi, i.e. ∆ 6 ⊢rk ϕi ∧ ¬ψi ❀ F, is covered by
other ϕj ∧ ¬ψj . However, because of its fine-grained quan-
titative character, |∼me is actually representation-dependent,
i.e. the solution depends on how we describe a problem
in L, it is not invariant under boolean automorphisms of
BL. Fortunately, there are two other natural representation-
independent ways to pick up a canonical justifiably con-
structible model.
• System JZ is based on on a natural canonical hierarchi-
cal ranking construction in the tradition of System Z and
ensures justifiable constructibility [Wey 98, 03]. It consti-
tutes a uniform way to implement the minimal informa-
tion philosophy at the ranking level.
• System JJR is based on the fusion of the justifiably con-
structible ranking models of ∆, i.e. Ijjr(∆) = {R∆jjr},
where for all A ∈ BL, R∆jjr(A) = Min≤ptIjj(∆). |∼jjr
may be of particular interest because its canonical rank-
ing model is at least as plausible as every justifiably con-
structible one.
Note that for non-canonical Ijj(∆), it is possible that
R∆jjr 6∈ Ijj(∆). We have |∼jj ⊂ |∼me, |∼jz , |∼jjr . Fortu-
nately, for the generic default sets we will use to interpret
abstract argumentation frameworks, all four turn out to be
equivalent. To conclude this section, let us consider a simple
example with a single JJ-model.
Big birds example:
Non-flying birds are not inferred to be small.
3Similar ideas can be found in [BSS 00, KI 01].
{B,¬F} ∪ {B ❀ S,B ❀ F,¬S ❀ ¬F} 6|∼jj S
The canonical JJ/ME/JZ/JJR-model is then
R = R0 + 1[¬F ] + 2[¬S ∧ F ]. But R 6|=rk B ∧ ¬F ❀ S
because R(B ∧ ¬F ∧ S) = R(B ∧ ¬F ∧ ¬S) = 1
3 Abstract argumentation
The idea of abstract argumentation theory, launched by
Dung [Dun 95], has been to replace the traditional bottom-
up strategy, which models and exploits the logical fine struc-
ture of arguments, by a top-down perspective, where argu-
ments become black boxes evaluated only based on knowl-
edge about specific logical or extra-logical relationships
connecting them. It is interesting to see that such a coarse-
grained relational analysis often seems sufficient to deter-
mine which collections of instantiated arguments are reason-
able. In addition to possible conceptual and computational
gains, the abstract viewpoint offers furthermore a powerful
methodological tool for general argumentation-theoretic in-
vestigations.
An abstract argumentation framework in the original
sense of Dung is a structure of the form A = (A,✄),
where A is a collection of abstract entities representing ar-
guments, and ✄ is a possibly asymmetric binary attack re-
lation modeling conflicts between arguments. To grasp the
expressive complexity of real-world argumentation, several
authors have extended this basic account to include further
inferential or cognitive relations, like support links, prefer-
ences, valuations, or collective attacks. Our general defini-
tion4 [Wey 11] for the first-order context is as follows.
Definition 3.1 (Hyperframeworks) A general abstract ar-
gumentation framework, or hyperframework (HF), is just a
structure of the form A = (A, (Ri)i∈I , (Pj)j∈J ), where A
is the domain of arguments, the Ri are conflictual, and the
Pi non-conflictual relations over A. B ⊆ A is said to be
conflict-free iff it does not instantiate a conflictual relation.
For instance, standard Dung frameworks (A,✄) carry one
conflictual and no non-conflictual relations. The general in-
ferential task in abstract argumentation is to identify reason-
able evaluations of the arguments described byA, e.g. to find
out which sets of arguments describe acceptable argumen-
tative positions. These are called extensions. In Dung’s sce-
nario, the extensions areE ⊆ A obeying suitable acceptabil-
ity conditions in the context of A, the minimal requirement
being the absence of internal conflicts. For instance,E is ad-
missible iff it is conflict-free and each attacker of an a ∈ E
is attacked by some b ∈ E. E is grounded/preferred iff it
is minimally/maximally admissible, it is stage iff E ∪ ✄′′E
is maximal, semi-stable if it is also admissible, and stable
iff A − E = ✄′′E. Here ✄′′E is the relational image of
E, i.e. the set of a ∈ A attacked by some b ∈ E. In con-
crete decision contexts, we may however also want to ex-
ploit finer-grained assessments of arguments, like prioritiza-
tions or classifications. This suggests a more general seman-
tic perspective [Wey 11].
Definition 3.2 (Hyperextensions) A hyperframework se-
mantics is a map E associating with each hyperframework
4A bit of an overkill for this paper, but we couldn’t resist.
A = (A, (Ri)i∈I , (Pj)j∈J ) of a given signature a collec-
tion E(A) of distinguished evaluation structures expanding
A, of the form (A, InA, (Fh)h∈H). InA is here a conflict-
free subset of A. The elements of E(A) are called hyperex-
tensions of A.
InA plays here the role of a classical extension, whereas the
Fh (h ∈ H) express more sophisticated structures over ar-
guments, e.g. a posteriori plausibility orderings, value predi-
cates, or completions of framework relations considered par-
tial. If H = ∅, we are back to Dung.
4 Concretizing arguments
Ideally, abstract argumentation frameworks should be
reconstructible as actual abstractions of logic-based argu-
mentation scenarios. Such an anchoring seems required
to develop, evaluate, and apply the abstract models in a
suitable way. In a first step, this amounts to instantiate the
abstract arguments from the framework domain by logical
entities representing concrete arguments, and to interpret
the abstract framework structure by specific inferential or
evaluational relationships fitting the conceptual intentions
the abstract level tries to capture. In what follows we will
sketch a natural hierarchy of instantiation layers, passing
from more concrete, deep instantiations, to more abstract,
shallow ones, with a focus on the intermediate level.
Structured instantiations:
We start with logic-based structured argumentation over a
defeasible conditional logic Lδ = (L ∪ L(։,❀),⊢δ, |∼δ),
with (L,⊢) as a classical Tarskian background logic. For the
moment, we do not impose any further a priori conditions
on Lδ . But eventually we will turn to specific ranking-based
default formalisms. In the context of Lδ , a concrete defeasi-
ble argument a for a claim ψa ∈ L, exploiting some given
general knowledge base Σ∪∆, is modeled by a finite rooted
defeasible inference tree Ta whose nodes s are tagged by
local claims ηs ∈ L ∪ L(։,❀) such that
• the root node is tagged by ψa,
• the leaf nodes are tagged by ηs ∈ Σa ∪ ∆a ∪ Λ, where
Λ = {T}∪{ϕ։ ϕ, ϕ❀ ϕ | ϕ ∈ L} (basic tautologies),
• the non-leaf nodes are tagged by ηs ∈ L s.t. Γs |∼δ ηs
where Γs is the set of claims from the children of s.
Σa ∪∆a is the contingent premise set of a, the premises be-
ing the claims of the leaf nodes. Within concrete arguments,
the local justification steps, e.g. from Γs to ηs, are typically
assumed to be elementary, like instances of modus ponens.
To handle reasoning by cases, which holds for plausible im-
plication, we may also apply the disjunctive modus ponens
for։ and❀, e.g.
Γs = {ϕ1 ∨ . . . ∨ ϕn, ϕ1 ❀ ψ1, . . . , ϕn ։ ψn}
|∼δ ψ1 ∨ . . . ∨ ψn(= ηs).
If Γs ⊆ L ∪ L(։), we can replace |∼δ by ⊢δ and ob-
tain a strict inference step. For our purposes we may ig-
nore the exact nature of the justification steps. Note that
the correctness of local inference steps does not entail the
global correctness of the argument a. Consider for instance
Σa ∪∆a = {ϕ} ∪ {ϕ❀ ψ, ψ ❀ ¬ϕ}, which is consistent
w.r.t. |∼δ= |∼I .
{ϕ} ∪ {ϕ❀ ψ} |∼δ ψ and {ψ} ∪ {ψ ❀ ¬ϕ} |∼δ ¬ϕ,
but Σa ∪ ∆a 6|∼δ ¬ϕ. This example looks odd because ac-
cepting the whole argument would require the acceptance
of all its claims, which is blocked by ϕ,¬ϕ ⊢ F. In fact, a
natural requirement for an acceptable argument a would be
Material consistency: Σa ∪∆→a 6 ⊢ F.
This means that the factual premises and the material impli-
cations corresponding to the conditional premises are classi-
cally consistent. Note that this condition is strictly stronger
than Σa ∪ ∆a 6|∼δ F because we typically have {T ❀
ϕ,¬ϕ} 6|∼δ F whereas {T → ϕ,¬ϕ} ⊢ F. However, in
practice, without omniscience w.r.t. propositional logic, it
may not be clear whether these global conditions are actu-
ally satisfied. Real arguments may well be inconsistent in
the strong sense.
In structured argumentation, an argument tree has two
functions: first, to describe and offer a prima facie justifica-
tion for a claim, and secondly, to specify target points where
other arguments may attack. It is essentially a computational
tool which is intended to help identifying - or even defining
- inferential relationships within a suitable defeasible con-
ditional logic Lδ, and to help specifying attack relations to
determine reasonable argumentative positions.
But what can we say about the semantic content of an
argument represented by such a tree? What is an agent
committed to if he accepts or believes a given argument, or
a whole collection of arguments? Which tree attributes have
to be known to specify this content? What is the meaning of
attacks between arguments?
Conditional instantiations:
Our basic idea is that, whatever the requirements for argu-
mentation trees in the context of Lδ , and whatever the con-
tent of an argument a represented by such a tree Ta, it should
only depend on the collection of local claims {ηs | s node
of Ta}, and more specifically, on the choice of the main
claim ψa, the premise claims Σa ∪∆a, and the intermediate
claims Ψa. In fact, because the acceptance of a structured
argument includes the acceptance of all its subarguments,
we have to consider the main claims of the subarguments
as well. So we can assume that the content of Ta is fixed
by the triple (Σa ∪ ∆a,Ψa, ψa). An agent accepting a ob-
viously has to be committed to all the elements of the base
Σa ∪∆a ∪Ψa ∪ {ψa}.
To be fully acceptable w.r.t. Lδ , the structured argument
also has to be globally correct in the sense that all its lo-
cal claims are actually defeasibly entailed by Σa ∪ ∆a. In
particular, Σa ∪ ∆a |∼δ ψ for each ψ ∈ Ψa ∪ {ψa}. This
requirement should also hold for each subargument b of a.
But note that, because of defeasibility, this does not exclude
that the premises Σb ∪∆b of a subargument b could implic-
itly infer the negation of a local claim ψx external to b, as
long as this conflicting inference is eventually overridden by
the full premise set Σa ∪ ∆a. It follows that the strength-
ening of a subargument by choosing a stronger claim could
undermine global correctness. But if the intermediate claims
are always inferred and therefore implicitly present, we may
actually drop Ψa and just consider for each globally correct
argument a the finite inference pair (Σa ∪∆a, ψa).
Given a pure Dung framework A = (A,✄) and the de-
feasible conditional logic Lδ , a structured instantiation Istr
of A maps each a ∈ A to a globally correct argument tree
Ta over Lδ. On the most general level, we do not want to
impose a priori further restrictions beyond inferential cor-
rectness. In practice one may however well decide to focus
on specific argument trees, e.g. those using specific justifi-
cation steps. Each Istr(a) specifies a correct inference pair
Ilog(a) = (Σa ∪∆a, ψa), which we call a conditional log-
ical instantiation of a over Lδ . Ilog specifies the intended
logical content of an argument on the syntactic level. Note
that it depends on the tree concept whether we can obtain all
the correct inference pairs.
In monotonic argumentation, the consistency and mini-
mality of the premise sets are standard assumptions. But
within defeasible argumentation, a more liberal perspective
may be preferable. For instance, on the structured level, we
want to allow arguments claiming F. The reductio ad absur-
dum principle then offers a possibility to attack arguments
from within. Consequently, we also have to accept instan-
tiating inference pairs whose conclusion is F. On the other
hand, material consistency, the existence of models of Σa
which do not violate any conditional in ∆a, is a natural re-
quirement in the context of argumentation theory. But we
can replace it by a qualified version, restricted to those in-
stances where Σa ∪∆a is actually consistent.
What about minimality? First, it may obviously fail for
inference pairs obtained by flattening argument trees. Of
course, we could consider an additional minimization step
where we replace each (Σa ∪ ∆a, ψa) by all those (Φ, ψa)
with Φ ⊆ Σa ∪ ∆a and which are minimal s.t. Φ |∼δ ψa.
Although this may be computationally costly, it could be
theoretically appealing. However, minimality could also
be questioned because by adding premises, a conclusion
may successively get accepted, rejected, and accepted
again, letting the character of the inferential support change
between different levels of specifity, which calls for a
discrimination between the corresponding inference pairs.
Proponents of minimality object that these types of support
could, perhaps, also be reproduced by suitable minimal
(Φ, ψa). However, this assumption is not sustainable for
ranking-based semantics for argumentation, because here
the results may change if we restrict ourselves to minimal
premise sets. In fact, shrinking Σa ∪∆a to Φ may actually
increase the set of possible attacks. In particular, we could
have attacks on all the minimal Φ |∼δ ψa, but none on
Σa ∪∆a |∼δ ψa. Hence premise minimality may fail.
Shallow instantiations:
Let us recall our task: exploiting a ranking semantics for
default reasoning to provide a plausibilistic semantics for
abstract argumentation. But inference pairs, which pop-
ulate the conditional logical instantiation level, are still
rather complex and opaque objects. To model argumentation
frameworks and their semantics, we would here have to deal
with sets of sets of conditionals, whose inferential interac-
tions may furthermore be hard to assess. We therefore prefer
to start with simpler entities and to seek more abstraction.
Consider the main goal of an agent: to extract from ar-
gument configurations suitable beliefs, expressed in the do-
main language L, whose plausibility is semantically mod-
eled by ranking measures over BL. Given an inference
pair (Σa ∪ ∆a, ψa) representing the full conditional log-
ical content of an argument a, in addition to the main
claim ψa, there are three relevant collections of formulas:
Σa, C⊢(∆a∪,Σa), C|∼(∆a ∪ Σa) which represent resp. the
premises, the strict, and the defeasible consequences. If the
language is finitary, this gives us four L-formulas represent-
ing the relevant propositional L-content.
• ϕa = ∧C⊢(Σa) (premise content).
• θa = ∧C⊢(∆a ∪ Σa) (strict content).
• δa = ∧C|∼(∆a ∪ Σa) (defeasible content).
• ψa (main claim).
We have δa ⊢ θa ⊢ ϕa, and δa ⊢ ψa by inferential correct-
ness. δa specifies the strongest possible claim based on the
information made available by the argument. For our seman-
tic modeling purposes, we will assume that ψa = δa. If we
abstract away from the representational details, we arrive at
our central concept: the shallow semantic instantiation of a
extracted from the conditional logical instantiation Ilog(a).
Isem(a) = ([[ϕa]], [[θa]], [[ψa]]).
In the following, we will sloppily denote Isem(a) by
(ϕa, θa, ψa). One should emphasize that these propositional
semantic profiles are not intended to grasp the full nature
of arguments, but only to reflect certain characteristics ex-
ploitable by suitable argumentation semantics. We observe
that each proposition triple (ϕ, θ, ψ) with ψ ⊢ θ ⊢ ϕ
can become a shallow instantiation. In fact, if Ilog(a) =
({ϕ, ϕ ։ θ, ϕ ❀ ψ}, ψ), for standard |∼δ, we obtain
Isem(a) = (ϕ, θ, ψ). In terms of ranking constraints, this
gives us R(ϕ∧ ¬θ) =∞ and R(ϕ∧ ψ) + 1 ≤ R(ϕ ∧ ¬ψ).
5 Concretizing attacks
One argument attacks another argument if accepting the first
interferes with the inferential structure or goal of the second
one. To avoid a counterattack, the premises of the attacked
argument should also not affect the inferential success of the
attacker, otherwise the presupposition of the attack could be
undermined. In the following we will investigate attack rela-
tions between conditional logical resp. shallow semantic in-
stantiations of abstract arguments. We start with the former.
Let Ilog(a) = (Σa ∪∆a, ψa) and Ilog(b) = (Σb ∪∆b, ψb)
be two correct inference pairs for Lδ. We distinguish two
scenarios: unilateral and mutual attack. The idea is to say
that (Σa ∪ ∆a, ψa) unilaterally attacks (Σb ∪ ∆b, ψb) iff
the premises of both arguments together with ψa enforce the
strict rejection of ψb, i.e.
Σb ∪∆b ∪Σa ∪∆a ∪ {ψa} ⊢δ ¬ψb,
whereas the defeasible inference of ψa from the premises is
preserved, i.e.
Σa ∪∆a ∪ Σb ∪∆b |∼δ ψa.
On the other hand, (Σa ∪∆a, ψa) and (Σb ∪∆b, ψb) attack
each other iff they strictly reject each other’s claims, i.e.
Σb ∪∆b ∪ Σa ∪∆a ∪ {ψa} ⊢δ ¬ψb, and
Σa ∪∆a ∪ Σb ∪∆b ∪ {ψb} ⊢
δ ¬ψa.
This holds for instance if their premise sets, resp. their
claims, are classically inconsistent. This definition provides
one of the strongest possible natural attack relations for in-
ference pairs. Note that we have a self-attack iff the premise
set is inconsistent, i.e. Σa ∪∆a ⊢δ F. To exploit the pow-
erful semantics of ranking-based default reasoning, in what
follows we will assume that |∼δ= |∼I , where I is a ranking
choice function.
How can we exploit the above approach to define attacks
between shallow instantiations, e.g. Isem(a) = (ϕa, θa, ψa)
and Isem(b) = (ϕb, θb, ψb)? The corresponding inference
pairs are Ilog(a) = ({ϕa, ϕa ։ θa, ϕa ❀ ψa}, ψa) and
Ilog(b) = ({ϕb, ϕb ։ θb, ϕb ❀ ψb}, ψb). For an unilateral
attack from Ilog(a) on Ilog(b), we must have
I(∆a ∪∆b) |=rk ϕa ∧ ϕb ∧ ψa ։ ¬ψb, and
I(∆a ∪∆b) |=rk ϕa ∧ ϕb ❀ ψa.
This is, for instance, automatically realized if ψa ⊢ ¬ψb,
ϕa ⊢ ϕb, and we have logical independence elsewhere. For
a bilateral attack, we may just drop the condition ϕa ⊢ ϕb.
However, we do not have to presuppose that all the attacks
result from the logical structure induced by the instantiation.
In fact, in addition to the instantiation-intrinsic attack rela-
tionships, there could be further attack links derived from a
separate conditional knowledge base reflecting other known
attacks.
From a given Dung frameworkA = (A,✄) and a shallow
instantiation I = Isem, if we adopt the ranking semantic
perspective and the above attack philosophy, we can induce
a collection of conditionals specifying ranking constraints.
For any a ∈ A, the shallow inference pair supplies ϕa ։ θa
(alternatively, ϕa ∧ ¬θa ❀ F) and ϕa ❀ ψa. For every
attack a✄ b, we get at least ψa ∧ψb ❀ F. Note that this is a
consequence of choosing maximal claims at the instantiation
level. For each unilateral attack a✄bwe must add ϕa∧ϕb ❀
ψa to preserve the inferential impact of a in the context of b.
The resulting default base is
∆A,I = {ϕa ❀ ψa, ϕa ։ θa | a ∈ A}
∪ {ψa ∧ ψb ❀ F | a✄ b or b✄ a}
∪ {ϕa ∧ ϕb ❀ ψa | a✄ b, b 6✄ a}.
We observe that for each 1-loop, we get ψa ❀ F and
ϕa ❀ ψa, hence ∆A,I ⊢I ¬ϕa. The doxastic impossibility
of ϕa illustrates the paradoxical character of self-attacking
arguments. The belief states compatible with an instantiated
framework A, I are here represented by the ranking models
of ∆A,I .
Conversely, we can identify for each instantiation I of A
and each collection of ranking measures R |=rk ∆A,I =
{ϕa ❀ ψa, ϕa ։ θa | a ∈ A} the attacks supported by all
the R ∈ R. Let ✄RI be the resulting attack relation, that is,
for each a, b ∈ A
a✄RI b iff for all R ∈ R, R |=rk ψa ∧ ψb ❀ F and
(R |=rk ϕa ∧ ϕb ❀ ψa or R 6|=rk ϕa ∧ ϕb ❀ ψb).
The second disjunct is the result of an easy simplification.
If a or b are self-reflective, we have a ✄RI b because con-
ditionals always hold if the premises are doxastically im-
possible. Because in this paper we will mainly consider
canonical ranking choice functions, we are going to focus
on R = {R}, setting ✄RI = ✄RI .
Definition 5.1 (Ranking instantiation models)
Let the notation be as usual and A+ = {a ∈ A | a 6✄ a}.
(R, I) is called a ranking instantiation model (more slop-
pily, a ranking model) of A iff
R |=rk ∆A,I = {ϕa ❀ ψa, ϕa ։ θa | a ∈ A},
and for all a, b ∈ A+, a ✄ b iff a ✄RI b. Let RA be the
collection of all the ranking instantiation models of A.
That is, over the non-loopy arguments, the semantic-based
attack relation ✄RI specified by R, I has to correspond ex-
actly to the abstract attack relation✄. The collection of rank-
ing instantiation models is not meant to change if we add or
drop attack links between self-reflective and other arguments
because the details are absorbed by the impossible joint con-
texts. IfA andA′ share the same 1-loops and the same attack
structure over the other arguments,RA = RA′ .
It also important to observe, and we will come back to
this, that each A = (A,✄) admits many ranking instantia-
tion models (R, I), obtained by varying the ranking values
or the proposition triples associated with the abstract argu-
ments.
What can we say about classical types of attack? If we fo-
cus on the actual semantic content, rebuttal is characterized
by incompatible defeasible consequents, and undermining
by a defeasible consequent conflicting with an antecedent. In
the ranking context, these two types of attacks can be mod-
eled by constraints expressing necessities. The ranking char-
acterizations are as follows. Recall that ψa ⊢ ϕa, ψb ⊢ ϕb.
a rebuts b: R(ψa ∧ ψb) =∞, e.g. if ψa ⊢ ¬ψb.
a undermines b: R(ψa ∧ ϕb) =∞, e.g. if ψa ⊢ ¬ϕb.
In our simple semantic reading, undermining entails rebut-
tal because ψb ⊢ ϕb. There are four qualitative attack con-
figurations involving two arguments: ϕa ∧ ϕb being com-
patible with neither, one, or both of ψa, ψb. If a asym-
metrically undermines b, we have R(ψa ∧ ϕb) = ∞ and
R(ψb ∧ ϕa) 6= ∞, hence R(ϕa ∧ ϕb) 6= ∞. This implies
R |=rk ϕa ∧ ϕb ∧ ψb ։ ¬ψa and R 6|=rk ϕa ∧ ϕb ❀ ψa,
i.e. b ✄RI a and a 6✄RI b according to our attack semantics. It
follows that undermining has no obvious ranking semantic
justification if we stipulate that the defeasible claim entails
the antecedent. Also note that rebuttal is entailed by sym-
metric and asymmetric attacks.
6 Ranking extensions
Ranking instantiation models offer new possibilities to iden-
tify reasonable argumentative positions. Let (R, I) be a
model of the framework A = (A,✄). In the context of
(R, I), a minimal requirement for aceptable argument sets
S ⊆ A are coherent premises, i.e. the doxastic possibility
of the joint strict contents θS = ∧a∈S(ϕa ∧ θa) w.r.t. R,
which means R(θS) 6= ∞. This excludes self-attacks, but
not conflicts within S. S = ∅ is by definition coherent be-
cause θ∅ = T. Given that evidence ϕa should not be re-
jected without good reasons, the maximally coherent S ⊆ A
are of particular interest and constitute suitable background
contexts when looking for extensions. Each E ⊆ S then
specifies a proposition
ψS,E := θS ∧ ∧a∈Eψa ∧ ∧a∈A−E¬ψa.
ψS,E characterizes those worlds verifying the strict content
of the a ∈ S and exactly the defeasible content of the
a ∈ E. Because a✄RI b implies R(ψa ∧ ψb) =∞, any con-
flict a ✄ b in E makes ψS,E impossible. Note however that
R(ψS,E) =∞may also result from non-binary conflicts in-
volving multiple arguments, or a specific choice of logically
dependent ϕa, ψa. What are the most reasonable extension
candidates E ⊆ S ⊆ A according to (R, I)? One idea is
to focus on those E which induce the most plausible ψS,E
relative to θS among all their maximal coherent supersets S.
Definition 6.1 (Ranking extensions) Let (R, I) be a rank-
ing instantiation model of A = (A,✄). E ⊆ A is called
a ranking-extension of A w.r.t. (R, I) iff there is a maximal
coherent S ⊆ A with E ⊆ S and R(ψS,E|θS) = 0.
Observe that if S = ∅ is the maximally coherent subset of
A, then R(ϕa) = ∞ for each a ∈ A and E = ∅ is the only
ranking extension. While the above definition looks rather
decent, a cause of concern may be the great diversity of rank-
ing models (R, I) available for any given A. Consider for
instance A = ({p, q, r}, {(p, q), (q, r)}), i.e. p ✄ q ✄ r. A
together with a shallow instantiation I then induces ranking
constraints described by the conditionals in
∆A,I = {ψp ∧ ψq ❀ F, ψq ∧ ψr ❀ F, ϕp ∧ ϕq ❀ ψp,
ϕq ∧ ϕr ❀ ψq, ϕp ❀ ψp, ϕq ❀ ψq, ϕr ❀ ψr}.
If we assume that each set {ϕx, ψx} is logically independent
from all the other {ϕy, ψy}, then ∆A,I admits a unique jus-
tifiably constructible model, which therefore automatically
must be the JZ- and JJR-model: RA,Ijz . In this example it
is obtained by minimally shifting the violation areas of the
conditionals.
RA,Ijz = R0+∞[ψp∧ψq]+∞[ψq∧ψr]+1[ϕp∧ϕq∧¬ψp]+
1[ϕq∧ϕr∧¬ψq ]+1[ϕp∧¬ψp]+1[ϕq∧¬ψq ]+1[ϕr∧¬ψr ].
Given that S = A is coherent, there are eight ex-
tension candidates. For the doxastically possible alterna-
tives, RA,Ijz (ψA,{p,r}) = 2 < 3 = R
A,I
jz (ψA,{p}) =
RA,Ijz (ψA,{q}) < 4 = R
A,I
jz (ψA,{r}) < 5 = R
A,I
jz (ψA,∅) <
∞. BecauseRA,Ijz (ϕS) = 2, we getR
A,I
jz (ψA,{p,r}|ϕS) = 0.
The unique ranking extension is therefore {p, r}, which is
also the standard Dung solution.
However, without any further constraints on the exten-
sion generating ranking instantiation model (R, I), we could
pick up as an alternative R = RA,Ijz + ∞[ψp ∧ ψr ∧ ϕq]
such that R(ψp ∧ ψr ∧ ϕq) = ∞, resp. an I enforcing
ψp ∧ ψr ∧ ϕq ⊢ F . In both scenarios, the minima would
then become R(ψA,{p}) = R(ψA,{q}) = 3, imposing the
ranking extensions {p}, {q}. Because of R(ψA,{p,r}) = ∞,
the standard extension {p, r} would necessarily be rejected.
But this violates a hallmark of argumentation, namely the
unconditional support of unattacked arguments, like p. This
shows that we have to control the choice of ranking instan-
tiation models to implement a reasonable ranking extension
semantics.
The idea is now to choose on one hand, as our doxas-
tic background, a well-justified canonical ranking measure
model of the default base ∆A,I , e.g. the JZ-model RA,Ijz ,
and on the other hand, implementing Ockham’s razor, the
simplest instantiations of the given framework A. In partic-
ular, we stipulate that the instantiations of individual argu-
ments should by default be logically independent. We em-
phasize that the goal here is just to interpret abstract argu-
mentation frameworks with a minimal amount of additional
assumptions, not to adequately model specific real-world ar-
guments.
We can satisfy these desiderata by using disjoint vocabu-
laries for instantiating different abstract arguments, and by
relying on elementary instances of the defeasible modus po-
nens for the corresponding inference pairs. That is, we in-
troduce for each a ∈ A independent propositional atoms
Xa, Ya, and set Ilog(a) = ({Xa} ∪ {Xa ❀ Ya}, Ya).
The corresponding shallow semantic instantiation is then
I(a) = Isem(a) = (ϕa, ϕa, ψa) = (Xa, Xa, Xa ∧ Ya).
We call I a generic instantiation. Up to boolean isomorphy,
it is completely characterized by the cardinality of A.
If we fix a generic instantiation I , then the unique justifi-
ably constructible ranking model of ∆A,I is (a✁/✄ b: a✄ b
or b✄ a)
RAjz = R0 +Σa 6✄a1[ϕa ∧ ¬ψa] + Σa✄a∞[ϕa ∧ ¬ψa] +
Σa✄b1[ϕa ∧ ϕb ∧ ¬ψa] + Σa✁/✄b∞[ψa ∧ ψb]
= R0 +Σa 6✄a1[Xa ∧ ¬Ya] + Σa✄a∞[Xa ∧ ¬Ya] +
Σa✄b1[Xa ∧Xb ∧ ¬Ya] + Σa✁/✄b∞[Xa ∧ Ya ∧Xb ∧ Yb].
Because the {Xa, Ya} are logically independent for distinct
a, and the defaults expressing an attack a ✄ b just concern
Xa ∧ Xb, only those Xa with a ✄ a become impossible.
In fact, {ϕa ❀ ψa, ψa ∧ ψa ❀ F} ⊢rk ϕa ❀ F. Hence,
in line with intuition, the ranking instantiation model
(RAjz , I) will trivialize exactly the self-defeating arguments.
Assuming genericity, A+ = {a ∈ A | a 6✄ a} is then the
unique maximal coherent subset of A. We are now ready to
specify our ranking-based evaluation semantics. Note that
all the generic I are essentially equivalent.
JZ-evaluation semantics (JZ-extensions):
Ejz(A) = {E ⊆ A | E ranking extension w.r.t. (RA,Ijz , I)
for any/all generic I}.
There is actually a simple algorithm to identify the JZ-
extensions using extension weights.
Definition 6.2 (Extension weight) For each argumenta-
tion framework A = (A,✄), the extension weight function
rA : 2
A → [0,∞] is defined as follows: If E is conflict-free,
rA(E) = |A+ − E|+ |{a ∈ A+ − E | ∃b ∈ A+(a✄ b ∧
b 6✄a)}|, if not, rA(E) =∞.
It is not too difficult to see that rA(E) = RA,Ijz (ψA+,E).
Hence, E ∈ Ejz(A) iff rA(E) = min{rA(X) | X ⊆ A}.
That is, the JZ-extensions are those where the sum of the
number of non-reflective non-extension arguments and the
number of one-sided attacks starting from them is minimal.
7 Examples and properties
To get a better understanding of the ranking extension
semantics and its relation with other extension concepts,
let us first take a look at how it handles some basic ex-
amples. Because of its uncommon semantic perspective
and its partly quantitative character, we will observe some
unorthodox behaviour. Under instantiation genericity, it is
enough to compare RA,I(ψA+,E) for E ⊆ A+, or to focus
on 1-loop-free frameworks. For each instance, we specify
the domain A and the full attack relation ✄. ψA+,{x1...xn} is
abbreviated by ψx1,...,xn resp. ψ∅.
Simple reinstatement: {a, b, c} with a✄ b✄ c.
The grounded extension {a, c} is the canonical result
put forward by any standard acceptability semantics. The
unique JJ-model, i.e. the JZ-model R of ∆A,I , satisfies
R(ψa) = R(ψb) = 3, R(ψc) = 4, R(ψa,c) = 2, and
R(ψ∅) = 5. The other candidates all get rank ∞. Because
R(ψa,c) is minimal, {a, c} is the only JZ-ranking extension,
i.e. Ejz(A) = {{a, c}}.
3-loop: {a, b, c} with a✄ b✄ c✄ a.
Semantics under the admissibility dogm reject
{a}, {b}, {c}, only ∅ is admissible. But the JZ-model
R verifies R(ψa) = R(ψb) = R(ψc) = 4 < 5 = R(ψ∅).
Because all the alternatives are set to ∞, our ranking
extensions are the maximal conflict-free sets {a}, {b}, {c},
i.e., Ejz clearly violates admissibility.
Attack on 2-loop: {a, b, c} with a✄ b✄ c✄ b.
We have R(ψ∅) = 4, R(ψa) = 2, R(ψb) = R(ψc) =
3, R(ψa,c) = 1, but ∞ for the others. Here Ejz(A) =
{{a, c}} picks up the canonical stable extension.
Attack from 2-loop: {a, b, c} with b✄ a✄ b✄ c.
We get R(ψ∅) = 4, R(ψa) = 3, R(ψb) = 2, R(ψc) = 3,
R(ψa,b) = R(ψb,c) = ∞, and R(ψa,c) = 2.
Ejz(A) = {{b}, {a, c}} thus collects the stable exten-
sions.
3,1-loop: {a, b, c} with a✄ a✄ b✄ c✄ a.
E = ∅ is here the only admissible extension. The
maximal coherent set is A+ = {b, c}, and we get
R(ψb) = 1, R(ψc) = 2, as well as R(ψ∅) = 3. It follows
that Ejz(A) = {{b}}, rejecting the stage extension {c}.
3,2-loop: {a, b, c} with b✄ a✄ b✄ c✄ a.
We have R(ψ∅) = 5, R(ψa) = 4, R(ψb) = 3, and
R(ψc) = 3, i.e. Ejz(A) = {{b}, {c}}. But the stable
extension {b} is the only admissible ranking extension.
The previous examples show that the ranking extension
semantics Ejz can diverge considerably from all the other
major proposals found in the literature. It may look as if the
main difference is its more liberal attitude towards some
non-admissible, but still justifiable extensions. However,
the semantics has an even more exotic flavour. Consider
the following scenarios, where we indicate the minimal
extension weights rA(E).
2-loop chain: {a, b, c}, b✄ a✄ b✄ c✄ b :
r({a, c}) = 1 < 2 = r({b}).
Splitted 3-chain: {a, b, c, d}, a✄ b✄ c, a✄ d✄ c :
r({a, c}) = r({b, d}) = 4.
Spoon: {a, b, c, d}, a✄ b✄ c✄ d✄ c :
r({a, d}) = r({a, c}) = r({b, d}) = 3.
The first example documents the rejection of a stable
extension, namely {b}. The second one illustrates the
impact of quantitative considerations when dealing with a
splitted variant of simple reinstatement. The third instance
shows the coexistence of two stable extension with a
non-admissible one. That is, even attack-free a can be
questioned under certain circumstances. It follows that the
above ranking semantic interpretation of argumentation
frameworks deviates considerably from standard accounts
and expectations. Let us now investigate how Ejz handles
some common principles for extension semantics.
Isomorphy: f : A ∼= A′ implies f ′′ : E(A′) ∼= E(A).
Conflict-freedom: If a, b ∈ E ∈ E(A), then a 6✄ b.
CF-maximality: If E ∈ E(A), then E is a maximal
conflict-free subset of A.
Inclusion-maximality: If E,E′ ∈ E(A) and E ⊆ E′, then
E = E′.
Reinstatement: If E ∈ E(A), a ∈ A, and for each b ✄ a
there is an a′ ∈ E with a′ ✄ b, then a ∈ E.
Directionality: Let A1 = (A1,✄1),A2 = (A2,✄2)
be such that A1 ∩ A2 = ∅, ✄0 ⊆ A1 × A2,
A = (A1 ∪ A2,✄1 ∪ ✄0 ∪ ✄2). Then we have
E(A1) = {E ∩A1 | E ∈ E(A)}.
Theorem 7.1 (Basic properties)
Ejz verifies isomorphy, conflict-freedom, inclusion maximal-
ity, and CF-maximality. It falsifies reinstatement and direc-
tionality.
The first four features are easy consequences of the Ejz-
specification. The violation of reinstatement directly fol-
lows from how the semantics handles 3-loops. The spoon
example documents the failure of directionality if we set
A1 = {a, b}. But directionality also fails for other promi-
nent approaches, like the semi-stable semantics. Note how-
ever that it can be indirectly enforced by using Ejz as the
base function for an SCC-recursive semantics [BGG 05].
The following properties are inspired by the cumulativ-
ity principle for nonmonotonic reasoning. They state that if
we drop an argument rejected by every extension, then this
shouldn’t add or erase skeptically supported arguments.
Rejection cumulativity: (A|B: A restricted to B)
Rej-Cut: If a 6∈ ∪E(A), then ∩E(A|A − {a}) ⊆ ∩E(A).
Rej-CM: If a 6∈ ∪E(A), then ∩E(A) ⊆ ∩E(A|A − {a}).
Although our semantics relies on default inference notions
verifying cumulativity at the level of |∼I∆, it nevertheless
fails to validate the previous postulates.
Theorem 7.2 (No rejection cumulativity)
Ejz violates Rej-Cut and Rej-CM.
The counterexample for Rej-CUT is provided by b✄c✄a✄
b ✄ a, because {b} 6⊆ {b} ∩ {c}. The one for Rej-CM is
obtained by adding c✄ b. Here {c} 6⊆ {b} ∩ {c}.
Another idea for combining plausibilistic default reason-
ing and argumentation theory has been presented in [KIS
11]. It combines defeasible logic programming with a prior-
itization criterion based on System Z. While it handles some
benchmarks better than the individual systems do, its hetero-
geneous character makes it hard to assess. It doesn’t share
our goal to seek a plausibilistic semantics for abstract argu-
mentation and seems to produce different results even in the
generic context.
8 Conclusions
We have shown how the ranking construction paradigm for
default reasoning can be exploited to interpret abstract ar-
gumentation frameworks and to specify corresponding ex-
tension semantics by using generic argument instantiations
and distinguished canonical ranking models. We have con-
sidered structured and conditional logical instantiations, de-
fined attack between inference pairs, and after a further
abstraction step, introduced simple semantic instantiations,
which interpret arguments by triples of premise, strict, and
defeasible content. While our basic ranking extension se-
mantics Ejz is intuitively appealing and has some interest-
ing properties, it also exhibits a surprisingly unorthodox be-
haviour. This needs further exploration to see whether there
are approaches which share the same semantic spirit but can
avoid abnormalities conflicting with the standard argumen-
tation philosophy. Actually, we have been able to develop an
alternative semantics which seems to meet these demands,
but it will have to be discussed elsewhere.
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